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Summary: The author argues that globalization processes imply the self-deconstruction 
of the hierarchy of legal norms. Thus, legal pluralism is no longer only an issue for legal 
sociology, but becomes a challenge for legal practice itself. Traditionally, rule making by 
"private regimes" has been subjugated under the hierarchical frame of the national 
constitution. When this frame breaks, then the new frame of legal institutions can only 
be heterarchical. The origin of global non-state law as a sequence of recursive legal 
operations is an "as if", not only a founding myth as a self-observation of law, rather the 
legal fiction of concrete past operations. This fiction however depends on social 
conditions outside of legal institutions, on a historical configuration in which it is 
sufficiently plausible to assume that also in former times legal rules have been applied. 
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      "It is difficult to imagine a more dangerous, more undesirable and 
more ill-founded view which denies any measure of predictability 
and certainty and confers upon the parties to an international 
commercial contract or their arbitrators powers that no system of 
law permits and no court could exercise" (Mann, 1984: 197). 
  
 
 
 I. 
 
  In the year of 1991 the Cour de Cassation de Paris had to take a decision which 
invokes the double meaning of our title. "Breaking frames" is about the violence that the 
frame of law and the movement of law exert upon each other. The delimitation of law 
breaks the law, while the law breaks its delimitations. In the case Primary Coal 
Incorporated v. Compania Valenciana de Cementos Portland, the Court had to decide 
whether or not "les seules usages du commerce international, autrement dénommés 
lex mercatoria" should be allowed to break the traditional frames of international private 
law. Should the national court recognize lex mercatoria's "private justice" as a new 
positive law with transnational validity? Could such an ambiguous normative 
phenomenon which is "between and beyond" the laws of the nation states and at the 
same time "between and beyond" law and society be applied by arbitration bodies 
according to the rules of the law of conflicts? Does it contain distinct rules and principles   
 
of its own?
1 However the judges decide about lex mercatoria, it means breaking 
frames. Either the rigid frames of private international law are breaking transnational 
phenomena into a  
shattered multitude of national laws. Or the dynamics of the global market are breaking 
the narrow frames of national law and push for the recognition of a global law without 
the state.  
 
  Obviously, "frame" in this context means something different from its traditional 
sense of separating an image from the world. Frame in the sense of parergon is more 
than a simple static boundary between two legal orders or between law and non-law. 
Instead, frame as the paradox of a "cloture ouvrante" 
    
  "... is the transitory, and processual, oscillating zone of the in-between, between 
the internal and external, between the proper and its other, foreign (improper); it 
becomes the zone where translation (in its narrowest and its widest sense) takes 
place: parergon as the place which gives a place for the translation" 
(Dünkelsbühler, 1991: 208).  
 
  To be more concrete, a paradigmatic case of lex mercatoria would involve a 
multinational enterprise striking a huge investment contract with a developing country. 
The parties to the contract cannot agree on the applicable law: the enterprise fears the 
interventionist tendencies of the host country law while the host government cannot 
accept the neo-liberal framework of the multinational home-country. After several years 
of investment, the goverment of the developing country asks for a an adaptation of the 
contract to the conditions of the world-market which have drastically changed in the 
meantime, and invokes the principle of unequal bargaining power as an expression of 
"ordre public". The arbitrators come up with a bold decision. They apply neither the law 
of the home country, nor that of the host country, but the lex mercatoria. In addition, 
they discover that this lex mercatoria contains a far-reaching "clausula rebus sic 
stantibus" and provides for mandatory rules of "ordre public". Thus, they uphold the 
claim of the developing country. How could a national judge deal with such a 
scandalous decision? 
 
  Now, the judge of the national court turns to the scholarly authorities in 
international commercial law and is surprised to be drawn into a violent "war of faith": 
French professors zealoulsy assert that a secret "societas mercatorum", a well-
organized and close-knit association of merchants exists on today's world markets and 
acts as a legislator of lex mercatoria. With cold contempt, their British and American 
counterparts declare this commercial freemasonry a "phantome of Sorbonne 
professors".
2  
 
                     
1) Cour d'Appel de Paris 1.9.1988, Nr. 5953, Revue de l'arbitrage 1990, 701-712;  13.7. 1989, Revue de 
l'arbitrage 1990, 663-674 (Lagarde); Cour de Cassation de Paris  22.10. 1991, Revue de l'arbitrage 
1992, 457-461 (Lagarde).  
2) Pro: Goldman, 1964; 1979; 1986; 1993; Fouchard, 1965; 1983; Kahn, 1982; 1992; Loquin, 1986; 
Osman, 1992; Stein, 1995. Contra: Mann, 1968; 1984; Kassis, 1984; Mustill, 1987; Delaume, 1989; 
Highet, 1989; Bar, 1987: 76ff.; Sandrock, 1989: 77ff.; Spickhoff, 1992; for a recent sociological analysis, 
Dezalay & Garth, 1995.   
 
  Our judge being aware that his question of the legal nature of lex mercatoria is 
one of the rare cases where legal practice directly depends on legal theory, turns to the 
Académie Européenne de la theorie du droit, Bruxelles, and asks for a learned opinion 
on the following questions which he drew directly from the legal theory textbooks: 
 
  1. In order to decide whether or not lex mercatoria is positive valid law, 
can you identify a Grundnorm on the global scale, if not, at least a 
worldwide ultimate rule of recognition? 
 
  3. What are the secondary rules which would recognize the primary rules 
of lex mercatoria and to distinguish them from mere professional social 
norms? 
 
  3. What are the foundations of lex mercatoria and which year do you 
determine as its date of origin?  
 
  To his great embarrassment, our judge has to find out that at the Bruxelles 
centre, his heroes Hans Kelsen, Herbert Hart, Maurice Hauriou, Max Weber, Theodor 
Geiger, Eugen Ehrlich are being treated with mild contempt as defunct theorists, while 
the new heroes, most of them non-lawyers - French post-structuralist philosophers, 
American professors of English and law, and Chilenean biologists - seem no longer be 
interested in his trivial questions. First, they suggest him to deconstruct lex mercatoria 
to pieces. They want to make him believe that this proto-commercial law is nothing but 
a hidden paradox, a simultaneous game and non-game, serious and non-serious, law 
and non-law. Then, they analyse global markets as a chaotic field with lex mercatoria as 
its fatal attractor. Worse, they reveal its secret relations to the inconscious and the 
sacred principle of filiation. Worst of all, they denounce the lawmaking of international 
businessmen as continuous auto-erotic activities, etc., etc. But who cares for our 
judge's sober real world questions? 
 
  Our judge is courageous. He delves into a book with the exotic title Law and the 
Game Paradoxes. After having struggled his way through 175 pages of hypercomplex 
formulations he suddenly utters a sigh of relief. § 5 of Section II of Chapter III entitled 
"Internality and externality", discusses precisely what he was looking for in the search of 
lex mercatoria. Indeed, he reads that his lex mercatoria is only part of a whole array of 
similar global phenomena: "droits transnationaux produits par divers groupes, religieus, 
sportifs, économiques, sociaux, humanitaires".
3 And he finds extensive answers to his 
three questions: the definition of law (question  of identity), legal pluralism (question of 
the limits of law) and the foundation of law (question of the origin). 
 
 II. 
 
  From the "théorie ludique du droit" our judge learns why in his search for the 
legal nature of lex mercatoria it is wrong to look for the Grundnorm or the ultimate rule 
of recognition. Like any other myth of foundation, these mythical formula of modern 
                     
3) Kerchove & Ost, 1992: 184. Whenever the text infra gives pages by parenthesis only it refers to this 
text.    
 
positivism do nothing but hide the basic circularity of law, the paradoxes of self-
reference on which law is ultimately founded. In this central aspect, "la théorie ludique 
s'appuye sur la théorie autopoiétique". With respect to the founding paradox of law, 
Kerchove & Ost have constructed their game theory of law faithfully and more or less 
openly upon Luhmann's autopoietic theory of law (14f., 185ff.).
4  
 
  But then comes the bifurcation. When the question arises how to cope with the 
founding paradox of law, they warn our judge. Do not follow Luhmann's rigid "systemo-
functionalist positivism" with its exclusive and autarchic self-determination via a unique 
binary code (9f.). They urge him to avoid both Scylla and Charybdis, formal logics as 
well as systems theory. They criticize lawyers like Fletcher (1985) who still believes in 
the constraints of formal logics, treats legal paradoxes as fallacies of legal thought and 
insists that lawyers should and could "resolve" them. Equally, they criticize theorists like 
Luhmann who believes one can "circumvent" paradoxes by rigid techniques of 
deparadoxification. In their view, Luhmann is marginalizing paradoxes, creating new 
"obstacles épistémologiques", escaping from the "entre deux". Instead, they show our 
judge a totally different way of coping with legal paradoxes. Your Honour, you have 
"resolutely to accept the paradoxes" (14)! Instead of hiding them wherever possible you 
have to bring them out to the fore, to make them "vibrate" in order to do justice to the 
"entre deux" (15, 95ff., 185ff.). 
 
  The judge - vibrating half-reluctantly, half-willingly with the legal paradox - now 
poses to the théoreticiens ludiques his question whether or not lex mercatoria should be 
considered as positive law. Accompanied by a "sourire énigmatique" (99), the game 
theoreticians' answer is a gentle but decisive "Oui et non, bien entendu" (111).  
 
  Hey Judge, can't you cope with ambivalence? On the one side, lex mercatoria 
clearly is non-law. As a bundle of commercial customs, it belongs to the "vaste 
ensemble de normes, 'conçues' et 'vecues' au sein du corps social, auxquelles les 
juges sont toujours susceptibles de conférer des effets juridiques" (180f.). On the other 
side, lex mercatoria clearly is law. As an expression of international general principles of 
law, it would be one of those "operateur clandestins de juridicité" (181). Consequently it 
is, of course, both at the same time: "inside and outside, juridical and meta-juridical" 
(181). 
 
  Abruptly stopping the vibrations, the judge makes a last desperate attempt. He 
asks the game theorists for a criterion, an indicator, an operator that would help him to 
draw the bright line between law and non-law. The answer is quite flattering for him. 
Whether or not lex mercatoria is law, is a question of the "identity of law". This identity is 
determined by "l'intervention du juge à la fois l'indice et l'operateur principal de la 
juridicité" (179). In plain English: It could be you! The criterion is you! You are caught in 
a circle: The rule determines the decision and the decision determines the rule. But 
rejoice! The circle is not vicious, it is virtuous. It helps you to escape the trap of 
                     
4) This is the reason why Luhmann, 1993: 15, fn. 15, expresses doubts whether Kerchove & Ost's 
"théorie ludique" differs in substance from his constructivist systems theory. Then it comes as a certain 
surprise how polemically Ost (1994) is attacking system theory. Is there a hidden law which rules that 
theories the closer they are the more violently they attack each other?    
 
indeterminate decisionism as well as that of a rule-determinism. How that happens? 
The way out is as you can expect from a "theorie du jeu": Just do it! Play!  
 
 III. 
 
  What am I doing here? Am I attempting to criticize "law as a game" by ridiculing 
it? By no means, since this would amount only to self-critique and self-ridiculisation. In 
reality, I take law as a game more than seriously. I am convinced that "game" provides 
a promising paradigm for the analysis of law, particularly because it provides a double 
framework for fruitful analysis, the more narrow frame of social games and the wider 
frame of play of differences.  
 
  In its more narrow frame as a so-called non-serious activity outside the real 
world, game serves for law as a powerful metaphor. Importing fresh meaning to the field 
of analysis it brings out elements of the law that are usually suppressed by the more 
serious if not pompous talk about law's empire. It brings to light the fictitious, the 
suspended, the theatrical, the mythical, the inventive, and the playful. Kerchove & Ost 
break the frames of traditional "serious" legal analysis when they thoroughly, patiently 
and carefully exploit the game metaphor. As one can see from their rich studies, they 
are rewarded by new insights for the law and the legal process. The only thing I would 
propose to do here in addition, is to exploit the negation potential of the metaphor as 
well. What are the differences that distinguish the concrete social practice of law from 
the concrete social games? 
 
  In its second meaning, in its very general frame as a "play of differences", as a 
recursive process of transforming and substituting differences, I see law as a game in 
line with several parallel movements that attempt to construct a post-structuralist 
concept of law. What these movements have in common is to overcome the limitations 
of law as a static rule system which is so dominant in analytical jurisprudence, pure 
theory of law, and in institutionalism. In this respect law as "game" converges with law 
as "discourse" (Lyotard, 1983; Jackson, 1988), law as "discipline" (Foucault, 1975), law 
as "différance" (Derrida, 1990; Cornell, 1993), law as "champ" (Bourdieu, 1986) and law 
as "autopoietic system" (Luhmann, 1993). It is not by chance that Kerchove & Ost focus 
on problems which are central to all of them: indeterminacey, recursivity, reflexivity, self-
reference and - above all - paradoxes. Legal autopoiesis, law as game and other forms 
of post-structuralist legal theory have several things in common: the linguistic turn away 
from positivist sociology of law, the dissolution of social and legal realities into 
discursivity, fragmentation and closure of multiple discourses, the non-foundational 
character of legal reasoning, the decentring of the legal subject, the ecclectic 
exploitation of diverse traditions in legal thought, the preference for difference, 
différance and différends over unity, and most important, the foundation of law on 
paradoxes, antinomies and tautologies. But here the controversies begin (Teubner, 
1997b, 2001b). Deconstructivism is obviously satisfied to deconstruct legal doctrine by 
provoking and horrifying the scholarly community with antinomies and paradoxes. Legal 
autopoiesis poses the somewhat sobering question: After the deconstruction? 
 
  And law as a game? In my interpretation, they are trying to find a third way, an 
"entre-deux" between Derrida and Luhmann. And here is the problem. The "entre deux"   
 
might turn out to be a fatal trap. On the one side they do not share the deconstructivist 
gesture and want to overcome sheer destructive critique by a constructive attitude. On 
the other side they condemn systemic deparadoxification as a mere escape from the 
paradox and as a nostalgic return to origin, truth, legitimacy and power (14f.). Theirs is a 
heroic attitude: "accepter resolument les paradoxes". But do they develop the 
conceptual weapons to back their heroism? Can they avoid the serious consequences 
of facing the legal paradox: blockage or continuous oscillation? 
 
  "Dialectics" is what they proclaim as antidote against the vicious consequences 
of the paradox which is supposed to bring out its productive potential (24ff., 82ff.). I 
consider this as the weakest part of their otherwise brilliant oeuvre. Remember the time-
honoured adage that whenever dialectics is invoked, it covers a blatant lack of analysis. 
There is a wide cleavage between their programme and its implementation. Their 
programm of "dialectics without synthesis" (91) promises that the poles of legal 
paradoxes can be overcome either by mediation, or by dynamic interaction between the 
poles (60f.). They announce this programme for their five conceptual pairs: 
strategy/representation, cooperation/conflict, reality/fiction, regulation/indeterminacy, 
internal/external. So far so good. However, if one examines the implementation, 
dialectics boils down to a simple compromise between the two poles. "Simultaneous 
presence" is their main solution, if this does not work then they opt for an oscillation 
between the poles over time. 
 
  If one looks for example at the conceptual pair strategy versus representation, 
on finds that law is both at the same time, "à la fois instrumentale et expressive" (133). 
But the solution of this ambiguity is more than disappointing. The tensions between the 
two poles are "resolved" either as a diachronic oscillation between them or as diverse 
synchronic combinations (132). Similarly the tension between cooperation and conflict 
is "resolved" again by their simultaneous presence: "les interets de chacun sont à la fois 
convergents et divergents" (142), the social structures are "à la fois de consensus et de 
dissensus", the law is "à la fois 'irènologique' et 'polèmémogène'" (144). In this way, the 
tension between cooperation and conflict no longer provokes the search for creative 
solutions. 
 
  Thus, my main problem with theorists who play law as a game is that against 
their own intentions they just remain in the seductive twilight of their "entre-deux", in the 
ambiguous dialectics without synthesis, in the attractive ambivalences of yes and no, 
inside and outside, law and non-law. Their book is full of those suggestive ambiguities 
and ambivalences. In Kerchove & Ost's account, the paradox no longer provokes to 
search for new solutions. They make us believe that we can afford to remain in 
simultaneous presence and permanent oscillation of its poles. De facto, they renew the 
old "isosthenes diphonia" of the skeptics which "due to the equivalence of contradictory 
things and arguments wants to achieve first a restraint and then put the soul to rest"
5. 
There is no "serious" attempt to cope with the paradox, to take its "serious" problems  - 
paralysis of action and collapse of cognition - "serious". Everything is play. Here we can 
feel how the game/play metaphor which otherwise has turned out to be so fruitful does 
                     
5) Sextus Empiricus, Grundriß der pyrrhonischen Skepsis, Frankfurt, 1968, 94 (1,8) quoted in Welsch, 
1995: 320, fn. 34.   
 
                    
also exert a negative influence. The metaphor supports the somewhat complacent 
attitude of remaining in the ambivalences of law. As attractive as this aesthetically and 
emotionally may be, the results for legal theory and practice are more than ambiguous. 
If our judge has to decide, then "anything goes" or political opportunism will dictate the 
results. 
 
  Is there a way out? Particularly, is there an alternative to a "deparadoxification" 
which in Kerchove & Ost's understanding means nothing but a rigid repression of the 
paradox?  I would be tempted to follow the directions of "morphogenesis", a conceptual 
construct which has been proposed in the context of paradoxes: 
 
  'Unless one is able to escape a paradoxical situation which is what 
Whitehead and Russell achieved with the theory of logical types, 
paradoxes paralyze an observer and may lead either to a collapse of the 
construction of his or her world, or to a growth in complexity in his or her 
representation of this world.  It is the latter case which could be 
characterized as morphogenesis'.
6
 
  What is the difference between this morphogenesis and the legal players' 
dialectics without synthesis? My tentative answer is that "re-entry" might be (one of) the 
new more complex representation of the world we are looking for. In an abstract 
formulation, re-entry means the reappearance of a distinction in one of the sides of the 
distinction itself. In the language of Spencer-Brown (1972), what separates 
morphogenesis and dialectics would amount to the following. Whenever we make an 
"observation" we create a double phenomenon, we draw a "distinction" of two sides and 
make an "indication" of one of them. This fundamental operation of observation as 
distinction and as indication is concealing a paradox. When Ost & Kerchove would 
recommend to resolutely accept this paradox they would deal with it via "simultaneous 
presence" of and "oscillation" between the two poles. Spencer-Brown would describe 
their thinking as either continuously "crossing" between the two sides of the distinction 
or "cancelling" the form itself. Obviously, these are non-productive moves.  
 
  "Re-entry" in contrast would do something more complex. The original distinction 
has created a form with two sides. Now, the distinction between the two sides makes a 
"re-entry" into one of these two sides, it re-appears in itself. The distinction enters itself 
after the indication of one of its sides. Then it is no longer the old distinction. It is the 
"representation" of the distinction within one of its poles. It is the "internalization" of the 
external/internal distinction. A system makes self-referential use of the distinction 
between self-reference and hetero-reference. The frame reappears in the picture, the 
boundary becomes part of the territory. This internal reconstruction of an external 
distinction might be one among the possible increases of complexity described in the 
concept of morphogenesis. It does not de-paradoxify in the simple sense of denying the 
paradox, nor does it playfully accept the infinite oscillations of paradox between the 
positive and negative value. Rather, "re-entry" transforms and maintains the paradox by 
reformulating its contradictions as a distinction within a distinction.  
 
 
6) Krippendorff, 1984, p 51f.   
 
 IV. 
 
 Back  to  lex mercatoria. Law or not law - that is the question! According to the 
traditional doctrine of legal sources, lex mercatoria, no doubt, is non-law. It may be 
anything, professional norms, social rules, customs, usages, contractual obligations, 
intra-organizational or inter-organizational agreements, arbitration awards, but not law. 
The distinction law/non-law is based on a hierarchy of legal rules where the higher rules 
legitimate the lower ones. Normative phenomena outside of this hierarchy are not law, 
just facts. The highest rule in our times is, after the decline of natural law, the 
constitution of the nation state which refers to democratic political legislation as the 
ultimate legitimation of legal validity. Inspite of recurrent doubts, judicial adjudication is 
seen as subordinated to legislation. And, inspite of even stronger recurrent doubts, 
contractual rule-making as well as intra-organizational rule-production is either seen as 
non-law or as delegated law-making which needs recognition by the official legal order. 
Rule making by "private governments" is thus subjugated under the hierarchical frame 
of the national constitution which represents the historical unity of law and state. 
 
  However, globalization breaks this frame. The recurrent doubts cannot be 
silenced any more, they explode in the case of lex mercatoria and other practices of 
"private" global norm-production (Teubner, 2001a).  Lex mercatoria, the transnational 
law of economic transactions, is not the only case of global law without the state. It is 
not only the economy, but various sectors of world society that are developing a global 
law of their own. And they do so - as Giddens has put it - in "relative insulation" from the 
state, from official international politics and international public law (Giddens, 1990: 70). 
In the first place, internal legal regimes of multinational enterprises are a strong 
candidate for global law without the state (see Robé, 1997 and Muchlinski, 1997). A 
similar combination of globalization and informality can be found in labour law; in the lex 
laboris internationalis, enterprises and labour unions as private actors are dominant law-
makers (see Bercusson, 1997). Technical standardization and professional self-
regulation have developed tendencies toward world-wide coordination with minimal 
intervention of official international politics. Human Rights' discourse has become 
globalized and is pressing for its own law, not only from a source other than the states 
but against the states themselves (Bianchi, 1997). Especially in the case of human 
rights it would be "unbearable if the law were left to the arbitrariness of regional politics" 
(Luhmann, 1993: 574ff.). In the world of telecommunication we experience the Internet 
struggling for its own global legal regime. Similarly, in the field of ecology, there are 
tendencies towards legal globalization in relative insulation from state institutions. And 
even in the world of sports people are discussing the emergence of a "lex sportiva 
internationalis" (Simon, 1990; Summerer, 1990) 
 
  Due to their anational global character, all these legal regimes cannot be rooted 
in a national legal order. Ergo: no law. But what is the difference between a national 
contractual regime and an international one that would justify to call the first one law, 
the second one a mere fact? Here re-emerges the paradox which had been 
successfully suppressed in the case of national contracts and organizations. Does law 
as a game help? Law and non-law? Simultaneous presence or oscillation? 
 
  Obviously not. Let us then try the "re-entry". The distinction law/non-law or   
 
legal/non-legal (not to be confounded with the legal code legal/illegal!) re-enters law 
(Teubner, forthcoming). This is possible only if the traditional doctrine of sources of law 
is reframed. Let me attempt a brief sketch how this re-framing of legal source doctrine 
might look like. When the frame of rule-hierarchy with constitutionally legitimated 
political legislation at its top breaks under the pressures of globalization, then the new 
frame which replaces the old frame of hierarchy can only be heterarchical: it uses the 
distinction between center/periphery of legal normproduction. It decenters political law-
making, moves it away from its privileged place at the top of the norm-hierarchy and 
puts it on an equal footing with other types of social law making. In the center of the 
legal system are the courts with their judicial rule-making while political legislation 
moves to the periphery, still inside the legal system, to be sure. The distinction 
center/periphery, to be sure, does not recreate a hierarchy in the sense that courts now 
are more important than political legislation. With this distinction, the oscillation is 
supplemented by re-entry. With center versus periphery the law repeats, reconstructs in 
itself the internal/external distinction of law and politics. Legislation loses its centrality as 
the top of the hierarchy, it becomes peripheral, but retains the status of normproduction 
internal to the legal system. It is legal rule production in structural coupling with politics.  
 
  And this re-entry allows for a generalization, an expansion of the distinction 
law/politics into the distinction law/other social fields. The replacement of frames, from 
hierarchy to centre/periphery, allows to recognize other types of social rule production 
as law production, but only under the condition that they are produced in the periphery 
of the legal system in structural coupling with external social processes of rule-
formation. Here we find - parallel to political legislation - many forms of rule-making by 
"private governments" which in reality have a highly "public" character: technical 
standardization, professional rule production, human rights, intra-organizational 
regulation, and contracting. And here our judge will identify his "lex mercatoria", no 
longer oscillating between law and non-law, but clearly as positive law which however - 
and here lurks the paradox - has its origins in its close structural coupling with non-legal 
rule production.  
 
  Would this not amount to a grandiose de-legitimation of law? If we decenter 
political legislation which is democratic after all and send it to the periphery of law on a 
pair with lex mercatoria, intra-organizational rules and technical standardization, are we 
not betraying the old European idea that any law has to be democratically legitimated if 
we are supposed to obey? Let me turn this argument around. If we abandon the old 
practice to obscure the de-facto lawmaking in all kinds of "private governments" and 
bring to light that what they are doing is producing positive law which we nolens-volens 
have to obey then we ask more urgently than before the question: What is this "private 
legal regime's" democratic legitimation? At the same time, we see how naive it would be 
to demand a formal delegatory link of private governments to the more narrow 
parliamentary process. Rather, we are provoked to look for new forms of democratic 
legitimation of private government that would bring economic, technical and 
professional action under public scrutiny and control. That seems to me is the liberating 
move that the paradox of global law without the state has actually provoked: an 
expansion of constitutionalism into private law production which would take into account 
that "private" governments are "public" governments. And the potentially fruitful analogy 
to traditional political democracy might lie in the rudimentary consensual elements in   
 
contract, organisation and other extra-legal norm producing mechanism. Is a 
"democratization" of these rudimentary consensual elements feasible? 
 
  Thus, the answer to the judges' first question regarding the legal nature of lex 
mercatoria is unambiguously positive, inspite of its paradoxical character. Lex 
mercatoria is positive law. This is true not only from a sociological or anthropological 
perspective of legal pluralism but it should also be accepted from the official standpoint 
of legal doctrine. Underlying is the assumption that after globalization has broken the 
old frame of the rule hierarchy, a reframing of the legal sources doctrine as a heterarchy 
of peripherical normproduction, will have to take place.  
 
 V. 
 
  Our judge had a second question. How can we identify legal norms within lex 
mercatoria? It is very difficult to answer this question and traditional doctrine takes this 
as an additional proof that the whole thing does not and cannot exist. Legal rules, so the 
argument runs, are elements of closed legal systems. Beyond their boundaries there 
cannot be any legal rules. This holds true also to the law/society boundaries. Customs, 
contracts, intraorganizational rules are social phenomena, not legal rules. And it holds 
true for the boundary between the national and the global. Any legal rules need to be 
rooted in the law of the nationstate. Outside there are only "phantoms of Sorbonne 
professors". 
 
  Kerchove & Ost criticize such rigid concepts of law as being closed against other 
systems. Legal positivism in its traditional form as well as in its systemo-functionalist 
sense, they claim, cannot deal with the ambivalences of the "relative autonomy" of law. 
Positivism, whether old or new, is too rigid in defining systems, elements, and 
boundaries. Positivism does not take into account that "between the legal system and 
its environment incessant exchanges take place" (180). Phenomena like lex mercatoria 
and other legal forms of customary societies as well as post-modern societes show that 
the boundaries of law are not tightly closed delimitations, but are "'frontiéres floues' et 
les 'zones de recouvrement' entre les règles juridiques et les formes non juridiques de 
régulation sociale."(118). They propose to re-define the legal system in a paradoxical 
sense in which system is nothing but a "frail and unstable configuration, only partially 
integrated and not totally differentiated from the surrounding systems" (102). They even 
dare the bold assertion that the legal system "contains" always the non-system, and 
that a legal system "contains" elements of different systems (102). Lex marcatoria is law 
that simultaneously contains society. It contains legal as well as non-legal actions and 
rules. Good luck for our judge!  
 
 No  doubt,  lex mercatoria and other post-modern legal forms create a paradoxical 
situation since they break the old frame of law, i.e. the stable relation between 
legislation and adjudication on a national scale. To insist again and again on this point is 
the great merit of law-as-a-game theory. But a second time we need to ask the 
question: Do they make productive use of the paradox? Do they find a way out of the 
oscillations between the legal and the social? In my view, with their formula of "relative 
autonomy", they suggest a strange compromise which is something like a "half-closure" 
of the law. And with exchange between law and society they make another strange   
 
compromise which allows law and society to "contain" elements of each other. It is 
these two strange compromise which compromises their position and which ultimately 
blocks the "morphogenesis".  
 
  The crucial difference can be explained best in the words of François Lyotard 
(1983) whose postmodern theory of language games Kerchove & Ost like to cite but 
whose central message they tend to ignore. The différend, Lyotard's unreconcilable 
cleavage between language games, means that one language game does not and 
cannot "exchange" elements with another one. A language game can only be provoked 
to "link up" with a sentence that makes part of the other language game. Not an 
exhange takes place but a "re-enactment" of differences leading out of the infinite 
oscillations. Re-enactment is neither translation nor transsubstantialisation of the old 
element but an independent reaction to something else by which the game creates a 
new element. It can never do justice to the other language game, it is bound to be a tort. 
Thus, a language game does never "contain" elements of another game but only its 
own elements that were "linking up" to elements of the other game. I like to use the 
metaphor of "productive misunderstanding" in order to describe how different language 
games relate to each other (Teubner, 1992). Again we feel the absent presence of the 
paradox. The "mis" describe the innovation, while the "understanding" tells us that it 
builds on another meaning and not into the blue air.  
 
  Such a constructive distortion, such a différend, takes place in the case of lex 
mercatoria. The structures of global economic transactions are essentially non-legal: 
they build on factual chances of action and create new chances of action or of trust in 
future changes of chances. In ongoing business relations it is wise to keep the lawyers 
out. They will distort business realities (see Macaulay, 1966). Why? Not only do they 
replace the search for profit by the quaestio juris. Not only do they replace the cost-
benefit calculus by the maxim of treating like cases alike. Worse, they misread factual 
chances of action as legal "property", and they misunderstand mutual trust in future 
behaviour as contractually binding "obligations", as "rights" and "duties". And if their 
rigid and formalist claims and counter-claims are re-read in the ongoing transaction 
relation they will destroy precarious trust relations. The difference between economic 
chances of action and legal property and between trust and obligations is due to their 
different grammar. The lawyers observe economic action under the code legal/illegal 
and misread economic processes and structures as sources of law. Vice versa, clever 
economic actors misread legal norms under the economic code as bargaining chips, as 
new opportunities for profit-making.  We observe not exchange that leads to the mutual 
containment of law and the economy but a mutual distortion of law and economy. Their 
elements link up to each other, but nevertheless legal acts remain identifiable as 
against economic acts and legal norms against economic expectations.  
  
  Whenever arbitrators have constructively distorted economic realities by reading 
legal rules into them they have actually enacted a new positive law which is 
unambiguously law and nothing else. Lex mercatoria is genuinely part of the global 
legal system. It contains legal elements and nothing but legal elements. To be sure, the 
boundaries between the legal and the social are always blurring. But it is the productive 
misreading by the discursive practice of lex mercatoria that relentlessly defines and 
redefines its own boundaries. The process of "framing", of drawing the boundary, of   
 
self-definition is never finished. It is impossible to get rid of this rest (Dünkelsbühler, 
1991: 210). However, this is no longer the task for the national judge whose 
"recognition" of lex mercatoria is no longer "constitutive" for its operational existence. 
 
 VI. 
 
  What about the judge's third question, the origin of lex mercatoria? Here, 
Kerchove & Ost make a remarkable move, something that indeed goes beyond the 
usual oscillation between the poles of the paradox. As we would expect now, they start 
by re-interpreting the foundations of law either as regressus ad infinitum or as paradox 
of self-reference (185f.). They continue to assert that there is an interminable oscillation 
between internal and external foundation of law, positivism and natural law. But then 
they make a "dialectical" move which comes very close to our move of "re-entry" 
(188f.). They point to an internal fictitious fixpoint, an "as if" foundation of law. The law 
acts "as if" it had been founded at a certain point in time. In this myth of foundation the 
external foundation of law is reconstructed internally. Morphogenesis can begin to take 
its course. 
  
  I wholeheartedly support this idea. This is a moment when their dialectical 
method produces concretely the results that their abstract program promises. I would 
just like to push the idea somewhat further by making use of the distinction between 
operation and self-observation of law. A founding myth belongs to the second category: 
the law describes itself by an imagery about how it has been founded. The founding 
myths of lex mercatoria might be for example the modern renaissance of its origin in the 
medieval merchant law. Or it could be a legislative act as a "droit corporatif" by the 
(obviously fictitious) corporation of merchants. But in relation to the hard-core 
operations of lex mercatoria, self-observing founding myths seem somewhat 
superstructural. They tell nothing about the possibility of beginning recursive operations 
of a legal system and under which conditions they have their "take-off". 
 
  The beginning is in the middle! It is like in the famous "Glas" by Jacques Derrida 
(1974) where the text has no beginning but begins in the middle of a story which had 
already started. Recursive operations cannot begin ex nihilo; they can only refer to 
something that does already exist. They cannot refer to something outside of their chain 
of recursions, it must be something within this chain to which they refer. And if this 
"something" does not exist they have to invent it! Law as a system of recursive legal 
operations can only refer to past legal operations. The solution again is an "as if", but 
not the fiction of a founding myth as a self-observation, rather the fiction of concrete 
past legal decisions as basis for recursive operations. 
 
  This "as if" solution takes the detour via supplementing a lack. The lack of 
identity of a non-state law needs to be supplemented by the participation of an external 
social in the internal legal: 
 
  "It is only the assumtion of a (deficiency) as a loss which makes it possible that 
an original perfection - as unity -can be presupposed, which can be replaced later on. 
Thus, the (metaphysical logic of the) "original" identity can be perfectly reconstituted" 
(Dünkelsbühler, 1991: 212).      
 
 
  This fiction however depends on outside conditions. There must be enough non-
legal meaning material which law can misunderstand as legal. There must be a 
historical "situation in which it is sufficiently plausible to assume that also in former times 
legal rules have been applied" (Luhmann, 1993: 57). A commercial practice has 
evolved under the chaotic conditions of the global market, or should one say, the 
practice has been imposed by the stronger economic interests. These practice is 
"transformed" into law whenever it is pretended that the expectations have a legal 
character to which legal decision making can refer to. An international contract has 
been struck outside the frame of national contract law. The strange fiction is that its 
expectations are law. Organizational patterns and routines have evolved within a 
multinational organization and the fiction is created that these rules "are" labor law. An 
enterprising inhabitant of the cyberspace delineates a limited chunk, asks money for 
access, and pretends to have created property. Arbitrators pretend in commercial 
disputes that old arbitration cases which have been decided according to equity, "are" 
precedents for them and begin to distinguish and to overrule. This is a historical 
situation where lex mercatoria creates its recursivity based on fictitios precedents. 
 
  These are the external conditions for the take-off. To repeat ist, there must be 
sediments of social communication that can be used by the false memory syndrome of 
the law. Under the demanding influence of conflicts that press for resolution, the law 
searches for precedents and falsifies the sediments. No doubt that these sediments 
exist. But the law gives them meaning as "legal" precedents.  
 
  There are internal conditions for the take-off as well. Even if there is enough 
meaning material for the legal recursions to refer to, still those recursions need to free 
themselves from the inhibitions of the paradox of a "self-validating contract". How can 
we agree on a dispute resolution if we disagree on the validity of our contract? Again, 
Kerchove & Ost identify this paradox in their discussion of the "fable of social contract". 
And again, they show the infinity of "jeu de jeu", law of law which shows the 
impossibility of law as a closed system. And again, I would ask how do we react to the 
challenge of this paradox. How does lex mercatoria "unfold" the paradox of "self-
regulatory contract", of "contrat sans loi"? 
 
  Kautelarjurisprudenz, the practice of international draftsmen, has found a way to 
conceal the paradox of self-validation in such a way that global contracts have become 
capable of doing the apparently impossible. Global contracts are indeed creating their 
non-contractual foundations themselves. They have found three ways of unfolding the 
paradox - time, hierarchy and externalization - that mutually support each other and 
make it possible, without the help of the state, for a global law of the economic 
periphery to create its own legal center. 
 
  In the first place, contracts themselves establish an internal hierarchy of 
contractual rules. They contain not only "primary rules" in the sense established by Hart 
(1961: 77ff.) that regulate the future behaviour of the parties, but "secondary rules" that 
regulate the recognition of primary rules, their identification, their interpretation and the 
procedures for resolving conflicts. Thus, the paradox of self-validation still exists, but it is 
unfolded in the separation of hierarchical levels, the levels of rules and meta-rules. The   
 
meta-rules are autonomous as against the rules, although both have the same 
contractual origin. The hierarchy is "tangled", but this does not hinder the higher 
echelons from regulating the lower ones (Hofstadter, 1979: 684ff.; 1985: 70ff.; Suber, 
1990). 
  
  Secondly, these contracts temporalize the paradox and transform the circularity 
of contractual self-validation into an iterative process of legal acts, into a sequence of 
the recursive mutual constitution of legal acts and legal structures. The present contract 
extends itself into the past and into the future. It refers to a pre-existing standardization 
of rules and it refers to the future of conflict regulation and, thus, renders the contract 
into one element in an ongoing selfproduction process in which the network of elements 
creates the very elements of the system. 
 
  Thirdly, and most importantly, the self-referential contract unfolds the contractual 
paradox by externalization. It externalizes the fatal self-validation of contract by referring 
conditions of validity and future conflicts to external "non-contractual" institutions which 
are nevertheless "contractual" since they are a sheer internal product of the contract 
itself. One of these self-created external institutions is arbitration which has to judge the 
validity of the contracts although its own validity is based on the very contract the 
validity of which it is supposed to be judging. 
 
  Here, the vicious circle of contractual self-validation is transformed into the 
virtuous circle of contractual arbitration. An internal circular relationship is transformed 
into an external one. In the circular relationship between the two institutional poles of 
contract and arbitration, we find the core of the emerging global legal discourse that 
uses the specialized binary code, legal/illegal and processes the symbol of a non-
national, even of a non-international, global validity. An additional externalization of this 
reference to quasi-courts is the reference to quasi-legislative institutions, to the 
International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, the International Law Association in 
London, the International Maritime Commission in Antwerp and to all sorts of 
international business associations (Schmitthoff, 1990). Thus, transnational contracting 
has created "ex-nihilo" an institutional triangle of private "adjudication", "legislation" and 
"contracting".  
 
  Why is this externalization so important for the creation of an authentically global 
law? The answer is not only beause it unfolds the paradox of contractual self-validation, 
but also because it creates dynamics of interaction between an "official" legal order and 
a "non-official" one, which is constitutive for modern law. It introduces an internal 
differentiation between organized and spontaneous law production which creates the 
functional equivalent of "state law" and "contracts" in national contexts (cf. Luhmann, 
1993: 320ff.). Thus, arbitration bodies and private legislation change dramatically the 
role of the international contract itself. Although arbitration and standard contracting 
themselves are based on contract, they transform the contractual creation of rights and 
duties into "unofficial law" which is controlled and disciplined by the "official law" of the 
arbitration bodies. Private arbitration and private legislation become the core of a 
decision system which begins to build up a hierarchy of norms and of organizational 
bodies. It makes the reflexivity of lex mercatoria possible.  
   
 
  Thus, the global legal discourse founds itself on the paradox of contractual self-
validation and differentiates itself into an "official" legal order and a "non-official" one. 
This is a double re-entry. Not only does the legal system at large reconstruct the 
difference between internal and external as a a distinction between its center and its 
periphery. The periphery of law makes in itself a similar distinction between its own 
center - arbitration, associational general rulemaking - and its periphery - the legal 
transformations of economic transactions. 
 
 VII. 
 
  What is the ultimate difference between law as a paradoxical game and law as 
an autopoietic system? My answer: it is the difference between a philosophical and a 
sociological observation of law. The difference is revealed in the power that society, 
culture and history exert upon law's empire. Where philosophical observers discover a 
free "play of differences", sociological observers see a history of elective affinities 
between semantics and social structure (Teubner, 1997b). What does this mean for the 
paradoxes of the law game? 
 
  (1) While the legal philosophers Kerchove & Ost claim to have discovered the 
paradoxical foundations of law, legal sociologists would make the material basis 
responsible and not the superstructure. They would assert that it is historical forces in 
society and culture that make the paradoxes emerge. They create the structural 
conditions that law's foundations are suddenly seen as paradoxical, among others by 
legal philosophers. In our case of lex mercatoria, for centuries the above-mentioned 
contractual paradox, the self-validation of contract as the basis of private contract and 
organization could remain latent. The reasons for this latency are historical. The nation 
state, its constitution and its law have provided the safe distinction between national 
legislation and adjudication which was able to absorb all forms of "private lawmaking". 
The emergence of the paradox was not the ingenious discovery of postmodern 
jurisprudence whose deconstructive techniques reveal to us all kind of ambivalences, 
apories, antinomies and paradoxes. Rather, it was due to hard-core social reality - in 
this case: fragmented globalization. The difference between a highly globalized 
economy and a weakly globalized politics pressed for the emergence of a global law 
that had no legislation, no political constitution, no politically ordered hierarchy of norms 
which could keep the contractual paradox latent (see Teubner, 1997b). Thirty years 
before La Condition Postmoderne, and fifty years before Le droit ou les paradoxes du 
jeu, down-to earth-practitioners of international commercial law had discovered the 
paradoxes of lex mercatoria. Breaking frames is the business of social forces, 
philosphers are not strong enough; they just observe breaking frames. 
 
  (2) While legal philosophy tells us we are free to "accept resolutely paradoxes", 
their contradictions, ambivalences and infinite oscillations, and that we are free to play 
with them according to "dialectics without synthesis", legal sociology asks us again to 
listen carefully to what society, history and culture whisper into our ears. They do not at 
all tolerate a playful paradoxification of law; they force us to understand it as a 
provocation for action. The provocation is unambiguous. Draw a distinction! Build new 
frames! Unfold the paradox! De-tautologize the tautologies! Asymmetrize the 
symmetries! Identify the eigenvalues in recursive processes! It is the iron law of social   
 
self-reproduction that forces people to build new frames if the old ones are breaking.  
 
  (3) While legal philosophy encourages the dialectical imagination to play 
creatively with the legal paradoxes and allows for almost infinite possibilities to cope 
with them, legal sociology is more rigorous and selective. Again it is society, culture and 
history that will determine the conditions of plausibility for new distinctions that unfold 
the legal paradox. Thus, it remains to be seen whether legal pluralism will be socially 
accepted as a plausible basis for a theory of legal sources. 
 
  (4) Finally, while legal philosophy tells us that it will be able to fight all attempts to 
return to a paradox-free past, legal sociology suggests rather a historical process, 
almost a rhythmical movement, of de-framing, re-framing and de-framing...  In our case 
of lex mercatoria, we can feel even today where society will break tomorrow the new 
frames of an a-national and a-political law. How can such a "private" global law avoid its 
re-paradoxification by "public" political processes on a global scale? Would this 
breaking frames of private global law in turn not provoke new distinctions of 
constitutional law of the world society? (see Teubner, 1998, 2000). Whether the newly 
built frames are breaking again is a matter of social practice. Frames do not break by 
themselves, it is history that breaks frames provoking us to build new ones. 
 
  But the sociological distinction of semantics and social structures that I am using 
here is in itself paradoxical and legal philosophers will have no problem in 
deconstructing this distinction. I accept this. If they are tried, philosophers will always 
have and should always have the last word. 
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